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SUCCESSORSHIP LAW: THE IMPACT
ON BUSINESS TRANSFERS AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
GARY A. MARSACK*
PHOEBE M. EATON**
I. INTRODUCTION
An understanding of the impact of successorship law1 on
collective bargaining and business transfers necessarily re-
quires consideration of the legal concepts defining successor-
ship law under the national labor laws.2 This article initially
discusses the context in which successorship issues arise and
then summarizes the legal principles evolving from National
Labor Relations Board (Board), judicial and arbitral decisions
defining successorship law.
The legal concepts distilled from various applications of
successorship principles suggest that successor employers may
avoid bargaining and contractual obligations by properly
structuring business transfers. This article outlines the factors
which the Board and the courts have considered when ex-
empting a successor employer from its predecessor's labor
obligations.
Because successor employers are able to avoid such obliga-
tions by properly utilizing successorslup principles developed
* A.B., 1965, Marquette University; J.D., 1968, Marquette University Law School.
Mr. Marsack is a member of the firm of Lmdner, Honzik, Marsack, Hayman &
Walsh, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
** A.B., 1968, Marquette University; J.D., 1981, Marquette University Law
School. Ms. Eaton is an associate with the firm of Lmdner, Honzik, Marsack,
Hayman & Walsh, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
1. Successorship law has evolved primarily from decisions involving questions
about the legal obligations of a new employer who acquires a business to the employ-
ees of the former employer or their collective bargaining representative. See Howard
Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant Employees, 417
U.S. 249, 262 n.9 (1974). The Court in Howard Johnson noted that the answers to
these questions require an "analysis of the interests of the new employer and the
employees and of the policies of the labor laws in light of the facts of each case and
the particular legal obligation which is at issue, whether it be the duty to recognize
and bargain with the union, the duty to remedy unfair labor practices, the duty to
arbitrate, etc." Id. at 262-63 n.9.
2. Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976), which amended
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
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in the case law, the thrust of union proposals during collective
bargaining has been to incorporate into the collective bargain-
ing agreement strong language purporting to bind successor
employers to the agreement. Unions have negotiated succes-
sorship clausess which place significant pressures on predeces-
sor employers to condition business transfers on the pur-
chaser's assumption of the agreement.
While numerous articles have been published on labor law
successorship in general, 4 only a few have discussed the im-
pact on business transfers of successorship clauses in collec-
tive bargaining agreements.5 This article identifies and catego-
rizes the various types of successorship provisions found in
collective bargaining agreements and discusses the contractual
obligations they impose on employers when the business is
transferred.
The successorship concepts developed under the case law
rightfully limit the unwarranted expansion of successor obli-
gations. However, a review of collective bargaining agreements
indicates that unions may accomplish c6ntractually what they
have been unable to achieve under the successorship doctrine.
Contrary to case law requirements and authority, an increas-
ing number of successor employers assume the predecessor's
bargaining obligations and collective bargaining agreement be-
cause the predecessor is under contractual obligations which
force this result. Such contractual provisions can seriously
hamper, if not completely prevent, business transfers.
3. There exists a variety of successorship provisions in collective bargaining agree-
ments. The following provision is a typical example: "This Agreement shall be bind-
mg upon the parties hereto, their successors, administrators, executors and assigns."
Comment, Defining "Successors" and the Significance of a Successors and Assigns
Clause in a Collective Bargaining Agreement, 49 TUL. L. Rav. 644, 644 n.2 (1975).
See also, e.g., Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restau-
rant Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 251 (1974). An increasing number of agreements con-
tam more extensive successorship provisions. See infra § V
4. See, e.g., the "extremely limited sample" of articles listed in Comment, The
Successorship Doctrine: In Search of a New Focus, 17 WMLAME'rE L. REv. 405, 407
n.3 (1981) (over twenty articles listed).
5. For articles that focus on successorship clauses in collective bargaining agree-
ments, see Comment, Successorship Clauses in Collective Bargaining Agreements,
1979 B.Y.U. L. Rav. 99; Comment, supra note 3. For brief discussions of successor-
ship clauses see Severson & Willcoxon, Successorship Under Howard Johnson: Short
Order Justice for Employees, 64 CALiF. L. Rav. 795, 838-39 (1976); Slicker, A Recon-
sideration of the Doctrine of Employer Successorship - A Step Toward a Rational
Approach, 57 MINN. L. REv. 1051, 1076-78 (1973).
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II. THE CONTEXTS IN WHICH ISSUES ARISE
Successorship problems arise in a legal context which has
been described as "shrouded in somewhat impressionist ap-
proaches."6 More specifically, this context includes parties
with conflicting interests, national labor laws with competing
goals and a judiciary lacking congressional direction.
A business transfer involves the conflicting interests of at
least four different groups' which may be adversely affected
by the transaction:
Individual Employees. Individual employees often view
the business transfer as a threat to job security and contractu-
ally achieved rights.9 Rights such as wages, seniority, vaca-
tions and pensions may be viewed by employees as akin to
"vested" or property rights1 ° and as such may be fiercely
defended.
Employers. If employers are to remain in business, they
must have the right to transfer capital freely and to exercise
their prerogative to rearrange their businesses as they see fit.
When a business is transferred, the succeeding employer fre-
quently must change corporate structures, labor forces, work
locations, task assignments and supervision in order to oper-
ate profitably. The United States Supreme Court has stressed
that when the employer's right to make such changes is se-
verely abridged, employers may be reluctant to take over fail-
ing businesses, with the result that the flow of capital in the
free market may be inhibited. 1
6. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 299 (1972) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting International Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 414
F.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Leventhal, J., concurring)).
7. See Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 256 (1974).
8. Comment, supra note 4, at 406-07.
9. See Slicker, supra note 5, at 1052, where the author states:
[T]he impact of change in employer identity often occurs without prior warn-
ing to employees and leaves them little, if any, opportunity to plan in its wake.
Such a change may be peculiarly harsh for the individual employee since it is
often accompanied by a reduction in pay or the loss of accumulated rights and
benefits or even a loss of employment. Further, the employees' union choice
and the continued vitality of any contract negotiated in their behalf with the
employer are jeopardized by the employer change.
10. See John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 545 (1964).
11. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972).
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Unons. Unions possess an "institutional interest[s]' 2 in
continuing to represent their perceived share of employees in
the labor market. The loss of bargaining units as a result of
business transfers leads to a loss of membership and dues,
threatening the union's interest in self-preservation. In some
cases, two unions may be competing to represent the same
group of employees after a business transfer.13
The Public. In order to accommodate the public interest in
peaceful resolution of labor disputes, Congress enacted the
National Labor Relations Act (Act)14 to form the framework
for legally resolving the competing interests of parties em-
broiled in such disputes. One major goal of the Act has been
to achieve industrial peace by encouraging stability in labor
relations.15 But other fundamental policies of the Act include
recognition of the right to freedom of contract and encourage-
ment of the transfer and flow of capital in a free market.16
Also, Congress has repeatedly shown itself "unwilling to
purchase industrial peace" by curtailing the right of employ-
ees freely to choose who will represent their interests in deal-
mgs with their employer.17
Thus the Act creates tension between, on the one hand,
the goals of industrial stability and the survival of contractual
rights in collective bargaining agreements and, on the other,
the goal of furthering deeply rooted traditions of freedom of
contract and the free transfer of capital.18 The Board has the
initial responsibility for giving effect to the policies of the Act
and balancing the interests of the parties in a particular labor
12. Comment, supra note 4, at 407. The author discusses the interests of the
union and the other groups involved in a labor dispute. Id. at 406-07.
13. See, e.g., NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1972).
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976). See also Local 1424, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v.
NLRB, 362 U.S. 411, 428 (1960), where the Court stated:
[L]abor legislation traditionally entails the adjustment and compromise of
competing interests which in the abstract or from a purely partisan point of
view may seem irreconcilable. The "policy of the Act" is embodied in the total-
ity of that adjustment, and not necessarily m any single demand which may
have figured, however weightily, in it.
15. See statement of policy of Act in 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
16. See NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 287 (1972).
17. Id. at 303 (Rehnquist, J:, concurring and dissenting).
18. Id.
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dispute.19 Under this authority, the Board created the succes-
sorship doctrine to determine the legal obligations of the par-
ties involved in a business transfer.
The basic principle of the successorship doctrine is that
under certain conditions a succeeding employer may be re-
quired to recognize and bargain with the predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining representative. This is a practical approach to
the problem that results when the succeeding employer is the
only entity which survives the business transfer. Unfortu-
nately for the parties involved, this practical problem was evi-
dently unanticipated by Congress. The obligations of a succes-
sor employer are not specifically addressed in the text or the
legislative history of the national labor laws.20 Thus, the suc-
cessorship doctrine has been created and its applications re-
viewed in the "absence of Congressional guidance. 21
III. THE ISSUES INVOLVED
The Supreme Court has stated that the "real question" in
any successorship case is: "[W]hat are the legal obligations of
the new employer to the employees of the former owner or
their representative?"2 2 When the issues are analyzed in this
fashion, there is no single definition of "successor" which is
applicable in all legal contexts.2 Rather, successorship issues
are decided under "the traditional case-by-case approach of
the common law."'24 Under this approach general successor-
ship concepts must be distilled from cases decided under
"myriad factual circumstances. 2 5 Despite the difficulty of this
task, a few basic principles do exist which can assist in the
resolution of the following issues:
19. 29 U.S.C. § 153 (1976); NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 346-47
(1953).
20. Slicker, supra note 5, at 1053 n.3. The commentator notes that "[tihe problem
of employer successorship first received congressional attention in the hearings which
culminated in the recent amendments to the Service Contract Act, 41 U.S.C. § 351
(1970), which specifies minimum wage and fringe benefit standards m service con-
tracts at government installations." Id. at 1053 n.2.
21. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S: 249, 256 (1974).
22. Id. at 262 n.9.
23. Id. at 263 n.9.
24. Id. at 256.
25. Id.
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1. When is the successor employer required to recognize
and bargain with the predecessor's union?
2. To what extent should the successor employer be
bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining agreement?
From these issues flow numerous subsidiary issues,26 many of
which are beyond the scope of this article.
IV. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS DEFINING SUCCESSORSHIP
CONCEPTS
Successorship concepts delimiting a successor employer's
bargaining and contractual obligations have evolved primarily
from three Supreme Court decisions: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
v. Lwingston;27 NLRB v. Burns International Security Ser-
vices, Inc.;2s and Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint
Executive Board, Hotel & Restaurant Employees.2
A. Wiley
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingstons° the Court con-
sidered the legal obligations of a new employer, John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., after the old employer, Interscience Publishers,
Inc., disappeared as a result of a merger. The union claimed
that under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act, 1 Wiley should be compelled to arbitrate the grievances
26. Two examples of such issues are the Board's authority to require the successor
employer to remedy the predecessor's unfair labor practices, see, e.g., Golden State
Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168 (1973), and the successor employer's liability for
Title VII unfair employment practices committed by its predecessor, see, e.g., EEOC
v. MacMillan Bloedel Containers, Inc., 503 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1974). Factual issues
such as whether the successor employer has impliedly assumed the predecessor's col-
lective bargaining agreement also arise in successorship cases. See, e.g., Hospital
Workers Local 250 v. Pasatiempo Dev. Corp., 627 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1980); Local
Joint Exec. Bd. v. Hotel Circle, Inc., 419 F Supp. 778 (S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd on other
grounds, 613 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1980).
27. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
28. 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
29. 417 U.S. 249 (1974).
30. 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). Section 185(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as- defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any dis-
trict court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without re-
spect to the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.
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of the former Interscience employees under the collective bar-
gaining agreement the union had with Interscience.
Prior to the merger, Interscience had eighty employees,
forty of whom were represented by the union. Wiley was
much larger than Interscience and had three hundred employ-
ees, none of whom was represented by a union.
At the time of the Wiley decision, the Board had already
fashioned a successorship doctrine which required that under
certain circumstances a new employer had to assume legal ob-
ligations incurred by the previous employer.3 2 The first re-
ported use of successorship concepts by the Board occurred in
a case in which the Board issued remedial orders against a
partnership that had committed unfair labor practices.3 3 One
of the partners subsequently died. The surviving partner con-
tmued to operate the business using the partnership name.
Although the original partnership had ceased to exist, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals enforced the Board's order
against the surviving partner, holding that in the "interest of
industrial peace" the remedial provisions of the Act are in-
tended to regulate not only individual employers but also the
"employing industry ",34
The Supreme Court recognized in Wiley that within the
context of unfair labor practice complaints, the Board had
previously required successor employers to recognize and bar-
gain with the predecessor's union if the employing enterprise
had continued to operate under the new ownership substan-
tially as it had before.3 6 However, the union had not claimed
in Wiley that it had a right to continue to represent the em-
ployees and had only pursued its rights under section 301.
The union argued that Wiley had a duty to arbitrate the
grievances fied under the collective bargaining agreement
with Interscience. The Supreme Court agreed, noting that Wi-
ley was also subject to state laws which imposed liability on
the surviving corporation of a merger for the contractual obli-
32. See NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179, 183 (6th Cir. 1939); Cruse Motors, Inc.,
105 N.L.R.B. 242, 247 (1953).
33. NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939).
34. Id. at 183. The portion of the Board's order dealing with compensation for
back pay was also enforced against the estate of the deceased partner.
35. 376 U.S. at 551 (citing, among others, Cruse Motors, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 242,
247 (1953)).
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gations of the disappearing corporation. The decision relied
primarily on the Court's longstanding preference for arbitra-
tion as the method for resolving industrial strife. 6 More im-
portantly, however, the Court observed that the duty to arbi-
trate could exist in circumstances other than a merger
situation where "one owner replaces another but the business
entity remains the same. '37
B. Burns
The Court again dealt with successorship questions in
NLRB v. Burns Internatinal Security Serwces, Inc."5 Factu-
ally Burns did not involve a succession to a business m the
usual sense. But the Court utilized Burns to stem the tide of a
series of circuit court and Board holdings which had greatly
expanded the Court's position as stated in Wiley
Prior to the Burns decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals m a section 301 action had interpreted Wiley as au-
thorizing the court to bind the successor to the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement.3 " Until the Burns case came
before it, the Board had consistently held that successor em-
ployers who met certain criteria were only required to recog-
nize and bargain with the union.40 But with its decision in
Burns, the Board expanded its position and held that Burns
was bound by the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement.41
36. Id. at 549.
37. Id.
38. 406 U.S. 276 (1972). Unlike the Wiley and Howard Johnson cases, which in-
volved § 301 actions concerning the successor's duty to arbitrate under the predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement with the union, Burns involved unfair labor
practice violations filed under §§ 8(a)(1), 8(a)(2) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor
Relations Act. The Court in Burns was primarily concerned with the § 8(a)(5) viola-
tions. Section 8(a)(5) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provi-
sions of section 159(a) of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 159(a) pro-
vides that "[r]epresentatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. " 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976).
39. Wackenhut Corp. v. United Plant Guardworkers, 332 F.2d 954, 958 (9th Cir.
1964). Accord, Joint Bd., Cloak, Skirt & Dressmakers Union v. Senco, Inc., 310 F
Supp. 539 (D. Mass. 1970).
40. Burns, 406 U.S. at 284.
41. Id. at 285.
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Burns became involved in the successorship dispute after
it successfully bid and obtained a contract previously held by
the predecessor to provide protection services for another em-
ployer. When Burns took over the contract, it hired twenty-
seven of its forty-two employees from the predecessor's work
force. Burns refused to recognize the union which had previ-
ously represented the predecessor's employees. Burns also re-
fused to adopt the predecessor's contract with the union.
The Court held that Burns had a duty to recognize and
bargain with the predecessor's union.42 The Court relied heav-
ily on the fact that a majority of Burns' employees came from
the predecessor's work force and that work force had recently
voted for the union.43
Significantly, however, the Court held that Burns was not
required to adopt the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement."4 It noted that section 8(d) of the Act specifically
forbids the Board to impose any particular concession or
agreement on the parties to a bargaining obligation.4 5 More-
over, the Court noted that it was inadvisable as a matter of
policy to require the successor employer in this situation to
assume the existing collective bargaining agreement:
A potential employer may be willing to take over a mori-
bund business only if he can make changes in corporate
structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task
assignment, and nature of supervision. Saddling such an em-
ployer with the terms and conditions of employment con-
tained in the old collective bargaining contract may make
these changes impossible and may discourage and inhibit
the transfer of capital.4"
Also significant was the Court's determination that a succes-
sor employer was free, with certain exceptions, to establish its
own initial terms and conditions of employment.47
42. Id. at 281.
43. Id. at 278.
44. Id. at 287.
45. Id. at 282.
46. Id. at 287-88.
47. Id. at 294.
1981]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
C. Howard Johnson
The Howard Johnson case was decided in the context of a
section 30148 claim to compel arbitration. By the time the case
came before the Supreme Court, the Board and the courts had
developed a variety of criteria for determining if a new busi-
ness continued to operate after a business transfer s'ubstan-
tially as it had before the transfer.4 9 The Court recognized a
need to consolidate the successorship concepts developed in
duty-to-bargain cases (Burns) with those developed in duty-
to-arbitrate cases (Wiley).5 0
The Court also reacted to claims that the rights enjoyed by
a new employer in a successorship context could depend on
the union's choice of forum.51 If a union pressed its successor-
ship claim in the context of an unfair labor practice charge
before the Board, the Board was limited under Burns to or-
dermg the successor to recognize and bargain with the union.
If a union pursued a section 301 action before the courts, a
court could compel arbitration, and the arbitrator could find
the successor employer bound by the predecessor's contract.52
The Court was concerned that the principles established
under Burns might be ignored in a section 301 action. 3
In the Howard Johnson case, Howard Johnson purchased
certain personal assets from the predecessor. It proceeded to
operate the same type of business, a motel and restaurant, at
the predecessor's location, but hired only a small fractin of
the predecessor's employees.54
Unlike the Wiley and Burns cases, the predecessor had ne-
gotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the union
which purportedly bound all "successors, assigns, purchasers,
lessees or transferees"5 5 to the agreement. At the time of
purchase, Howard Johnson expressly refused to recognize the
48. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976). For the text of this section see note 31 supra.
49. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 258 (1974). See also Comment, supra note 4, at 411.
50. 417 U.S. at 254-56.
51. Id. at 256. 6
52. See United Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co., 492 F.2d 713, 725-27
(5th Cir. 1974).
53. 417 U.S. at 256.
54. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
55. Id. at 251.
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union or assume any labor agreements or any obligations re-
sulting from such agreements. 6
In contrast to the Wiley situation, the predecessor in How-
ard Johnson survived the business transfer and continued as
a "viable entity" with substantial retained assets. Also, the
predecessor had previously agreed to arbitrate the extent of
its liability under the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court held that Howard Johnson should not be com-
pelled to arbitrate the union's claims, which were ultimately
designed to force the company to hire the rest of its predeces-
sor's employees. The Court identified the controlling factor
for determining whether there was "substantial continuity"
between the new business and the old as continuity "in the
identity of the work force across the change in ownership." 8
The Court reiterated that a succeeding employer should not
be required to hire a predecessor's work force and noted that
a new work force could be hired if the employer did not dis-
criminate against applicants because of their union affilia-
tion.59 Also significant was the Court's observation that the
"mere existence" of a provision purporting to bind successors
to the collective bargaining agreement did not compel arbitra-
tion or bind Howard Johnson to the substantive terms of the
agreement6 0
D Legal Principles Distilled from the Supreme Court
Decisions
Several legal principles may be derived from the Supreme
Court decisions discussed in the preceding section. These
principles can assist employers in determining their legal obli-
gations when a business transfer occurs.
1. Substantial Identity Between the Successor's and the
Predecessor's Work Forces Is a Paramount Consideration.
A number of factors are looked to when determining
whether an employer has the legal obligations of a "succes-
sor"- use of the same facility; employment of the same super-
56. Id. at 251-52.
57. Id. at 257.
58. Id. at 263.
59. Id. at 261-62 & 262 n.8.
60. Id. at 258 n.3.
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visors and work force; similarity of working conditions, equip-
ment, methods, products, services and customers." Also
considered is whether there has been any hiatus or break in
business operations after the transfer.2 However, in light of
Howard Johnson, it is clear that by far the most important
factor is substantial continuity of the work force across the
change in ownership.63 The successor's hiring of a substantial
portion of the precedessor's employees is a "major considera-
tion" when determining if the successor has a duty to bargain
or to arbitrate claims with the union. 4
While it is agreed that continuity in the work force is nec-
essary before legal obligations can be imposed upon succes-
sors, it remains unclear which work force should be used to
measure "substantial continuity "6 5 The analysis may depend
on whether the obligation at issue is a duty to bargain or a
duty to arbitrate. 6
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that
there is "no clear guidance from the Supreme Court" for de-
termining the measuring work force when the issue is a suc-
cessor's duty to bargain. 7 However, substantial agreement ex-
ists among at least five circuits that the appropriate test is
whether a majority of the successor's bargaining unit work
force is composed of the predecessor's employees. 68
Less settled is the question of the measuring work force
and the extent of employee transfer necessary (substantial or
majority) when a successor's duty to arbitrate is in question.
61. See, e.g., Westwood Import Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1213 (1980); Cablevision Sys-
tems Dev. Co., 251 N.L.R.B. 1319 (1980); Maintenance, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 1299
(1964).
62. Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 234 (1972).
63. See 417 U.S. at 263.
64. Audit Servs., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981).
65. Dynamic Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 415 n.29.
66. 552 F.2d at 1204.
67. Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 685 (2d Cir. 1980).
68. Saks & Co. v. NLRB, 634 F.2d 681, 685 (2d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Fabsteel Co.,
587 F.2d 689, 695 (5th Cir. 1979); International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Work-
ers v. NLRB, 604 F.2d 689, 695 (D.C. Cir. 1979); NLRB v. Middleboro Fire Appara-
tus, Inc., 590 F.2d 4, 8 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Band-Age, Inc., 534 F.2d 1, 4 n.6 (ist
Cir. 1976); Zim's Foodliner, Inc. v. NLRB, 495 F.2d 1131, 1141-42 (7th Cir. 1974);
Boeing Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 504 F.2d 307,
319 (5th Cir. 1974).
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In Boeing Co. v. International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers,69 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals con-
cluded that duty-to-bargain decisions were unpersuasive on
this issue and used the predecessor's employees as the mea-
suring work force."° The court's discussion proceeded as
follows:
To begin with, the showing of employee continuity is rele-
vant in establishing "the continuity of identity in the busi-
ness enterprise." As a matter of principle, since the duty to
arbitrate arises from an application of the contract between
the predecessor employer and his organized employees, the
entity whose identity is to be the reference point for judging
continuity ought to be the predecessor enterprise. Accord-
ingly, in judging the continuity-in the identity of the work
force, the incumbent component of the successor's work
force ought to be compared against the predecessor's staff,
not the successor's. 1
Clearly the choice of the measuring work force can be de-
terminative of the obligations to be imposed on the successor
employer. This is especially true if there is a large disparity in
size between the predecessor's and the successor's work
forces. 2 The courts have avoided addressing this issue in their
decisions by relying on facts which indicated that either all of
the predecessor's employees were transferred 3 or so few were
transferred"4  that resolution of these questions was
unnecessary
2. The Legal Obligations of Successors Are Controlled by the
Successor Doctrine Despite the Presence of a Successorship
Clause in the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
Unless the successor employer adopts the predecessor's
collective bargaining agreement, its legal obligations will de-
pend on the concepts developed under the successorship doc-
trine. This is true even if the agreement contains a successor-
69. 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974).
70. Id. at 319-20.
71. Id. at 319 (footnote omitted).
72. For example, in Wiley Interscience's work force of eighty merged with Wiley's
work force of three hundred. 376 U.S. at 545.
73. See, e.g., Audit Servs., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1981).
74. See, e.g., Howard Johnson, 417 U.S. at 259-60, 263-64.
1981]
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ship clause purporting to bind "successors and assigns" to the
agreement. The "mere existence" of such a clause does not
compel arbitration or alter the principles established by the
Burns case.7 5
3. Under the Act Successors Are Not Automatically Bound
to Their Predecessors' Collective Bargaining Agreements.
Within the context of Board and judicial determinations, a
successor's obligations with respect to its predecessor's collec-
tive bargaining agreement are primarily dictated by the prin-
ciples adopted by the Court in Burns. Successors "are not
bound by the substantive provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement negotiated by their predecessors but not agreed to
or assumed by them. '70 Relying on this principle, in decisions
subsequent to Burns the Board has not found statutory viola-
tions when successor employers have refused to adopt the col-
lective bargaining agreement unless the successor had agreed
to assume the contract and subsequently reneged on this
agreement.77 Also, since the Supreme Court stressed in How-
ard Johnson that the Burns principles may not be ignored in
section 301 cases, the trend among arbitrators has been to
find successors not guilty of contract violations unless they
have assumed the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement.7 8
Conversely, there are a few cases which indicate that some
arbitrators and courts do not consider Howard Johnson as
limiting an arbitrator's authority to bind a successor to terms
of the contract. For instance, in B & K Investments, Inc., the
arbitrator in dicta interpreted some remarks in the court's
opinion compelling arbitration as allowing him to bind an un-
consenting successor to substantive provisions in the prede-
cessor's collective bargaining agreement.7 9 When compelling
75. Id. at 258 n.3; Bartenders Local 340 v. Howard Johnson Co., 535 F.2d 1160
(9th Cir. 1976).
76. 406 U.S. at 284.
77. See, e.g., World Evangelism, Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 909 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Tn-State Asphalt Corp., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 102 (1979) (LeWinter,
Arb.); Shore Manor, Ltd., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1238 (1978) (Katz, Arb.); Darling &
Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917 (1977) (Martin, Arb.); Mahoney Plastics Corp., 69 Lab.
Arb. (BNA) 1017 (1977) (King, Arb.). See also Audit Servs., Inc. v. Rolfson, 641 F.2d
757 (9th Cir. 1981), which relies on an assumption of contract theory.
79. B & K Invs., Inc., 71 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 366, 369 (1978) (Turkus, Arb.).
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arbitration the court had expressly relied on the reasoning in
the opinion of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in United
Steelworkers v. United States Gypsum Co. (Gypsum 11).8o In
that case, which was decided before Howard Johnson, the
Fifth Circuit distinguished between the power of the Board
and that of an arbitrator to bind a successor to a prior ex-
isting collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator in B &
K Investments noted that another Fifth Circuit opinion ren-
dered subsequent to Howard Johnson, Boeing Co. v. Interna-
tional Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,8"
cited Gypsum II with approval. Therefore, he reasoned, the
Fifth Circuit did not consider Burns to have overruled the
principles of Wiley.82
A more appropriate inquiry might be whether the Howard
Johnson decision, which applied the Burns principles in a sec-
tion 301 context, in effect limited the principle stemming from
Wiley that an arbitrator may bind a successor to its predeces-
sor's collective bargaining agreement. So far the court deci-
sions compelling arbitration and enforcing the arbitrator's
award in the B & K Investments case represent the only judi-
cial precedent which indicates that the arbitrator continues to
have such unlimited authority.8" It should noted that in B &
K Investments the arbitrator ultimately concluded that the
successor had assumed the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement."4
In Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc.,85 an arbitrator relied on
the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the impact of Burns on Wiley
and concluded that his arbitral authority was "broader than
that usually conferred in 'grievance' arbitrations." 86 Using his
"broader" authority, the arbitrator required the successor to
remedy the predecessor's breach of the successorship provi-
80. 492 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1974).
81. 504 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1974).
82. 71 Lab. Arb. at 369.
83. Local 1115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees v. B & K Invs., Inc.,
436 F Supp. 1203, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 1977) (compelling arbitration); Local 1115 Joint
Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees v. B & K Invs., Inc., 100 L.R.R.M. 2174
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (enforcing award). See also Comment, supra note 4, at 415-16.
84. 71 Lab. Arb. at 370.
85. 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881 (1979) (Belkin, Arbs.).
86. Id. at 888.
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sion in the collective bargaining agreement.8 7 Under this the-
ory, the successor in effect became liable for the predecessor's
contractual obligations.8
Finally, in Standard Beverage Co.,8 9 the arbitrator ordered
the successor to honor the predecessor's collective bargaining
agreement, but it was to be applied only to those employees
hired from the predecessor's work force. This case is arguably
confined to its unique factual circumstances. In Standard
Beverage, the same union had represented all of the predeces-
sor's and the successor's employees before the transfer took
place. Also, both parties had been covered by the same collec-
tive bargaining agreement.90
The B & K Investments, Schneier's Foods and Standard
Beverage cases represent the exception rather than the rule.
The weight of arbitral authority indicates the demise, or at
least the severe limitation, of the principles stemming from
Wiley granting the arbitrator unlimited authority to impose
contractual obligations on successors.
E. Factors Considered When Determining the Successor
Employer's Legal Obligations
While each case turns on its unique factual circumstances,
the Board and the courts have considered the following fac-
tors when determining if a successor employer should be ex-
empt from recognition and bargaining obligations toward the
precedessor employer's union:
1. Cessation of operations for a significant period of time.9
2. Assumption of the predecessor's obligations and/or ac-
counts receivable by the successor.92
3. Changes in name, traits, styles and logos.93
4. Changes in first-line and middle-level management, par-
87. Id. at 887.
88. Id. at 888.
89. 80-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8022 (1979) (Thornell, Arb.).
90. Id. at 3080.
91. See, e.g., Radiant Fashions, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 938 (1973) (no successorship
where hiatus of two and a half to three months occurred).
92. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Tempest Shirt Mfg. Co., 285 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1960) (suc-
cessorship found where accounts receivable assumed); Radiant Fashions, Inc., 202
N.L.R.B. 938 (1973) (no successorship where purchaser did not assume accounts
receivable).
93. See, e.g., NLRB v. Downtown Bakery Corp., 330 F.2d 921 (6th Cir. 1964).
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ticularly those involved m labor relations matters. 94
5. Changes in business structure and operations.95
6. Changes in the work force.96
7. Purchase of assets, not liabilities. 7
8. An express intention not to assume the labor contract
that is stated in the sales agreement.9 8
V. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER SUCCESSORSHIP LAW
A. The Current Trend
Under successorship law, a successor employer may avoid
its predecessor's recognition, bargaining and contractual obli-
gations through proper structuring of the business transfer
and subsequent operations. As a result, unions have adopted a
94. See, e.g., Thomas Cadillac, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 884 (1968), aff'd sub nom. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See also Com-
ment, supra note 4, at 471-72.
95. See, e.g., Union Texas Petroleum, 153 N.L.R.B. 849,(1965) (no bargaining ob-
ligation found where the new employer planned to integrate the new business into its
existing operations). In Georgetown Stainless Mfg. Corp., 198 N.L.R.B. 234 (1972),
the trial examiner observed that the following criteria had evolved to determine
whether the employing industry remained the same after a business transfer:
(1) whether there has been a substantial continuity [in] the same business op-
erations; (2) whether the new employer uses the same plant; (3) whether he has
the same or substantially the same work force; (4) whether the same jobs exist
[sic] under the same working conditions; (5) whether he employs the same su-
pervisors; (6) whether he uses the same machinery, equipment, and methods of
production; and (7) whether he manufactures the same produce [sic] or offer
[sic] the same services.
Id. at 236 (footnote omitted).
When applying the first criterion to the facts of the case the trial examiner found
that no continuity in business operations existed since the succeeding employer had
decided not to produce most of the products manufactured by the predecessor; where
similar products did continue to be manufactured, they were sold to different cus-
tomer markets.
96. See, e.g., Southwestern Broadcasters, Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. No. 53, 106 L.R.R.M.
1340 (Mar. 26, 1981) (no successorship where the new employer failed to hire or indi-
cate an intent to retain a majority of the predecessor's employees). One commentator
has observed that "the Board has found successorship in only one case where such a
majority did not exist." Slicker, supra note 5, at 1055 n.11 (citing Firchau Logging
Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 1215 (1960)). See also United Maintenance & Mfg. Co., 214
N.L.R.B. 529, 536 n.21 (1974).
97. See, e.g., Radiant Fashions, Inc., 202 N.L.R.B. 938 (1973) (significant that the
succeeding employer purchased only the assets of one segment of an enterprise and
did not assume any of the predecessor's liabilities except for the lease).
98. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (successor em-
ployers are under no obligation to assume the union's collective bargaining
agreement).
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new strategy They now seek to accomplish indirectly through
collective bargaining agreements what they have failed to ac-
complish directly through judicial sanctions.
Within the collective bargaining agreement, unions at-
tempt to establish contractual remedies which are unavailable
under successorship law by negotiating for the inclusion of
strong successorship language. Such language may:
1. Require predecessors to notify unions of pending business
transfers. 99
2. Require predecessors to notify successors of the predeces-
sor's labor agreement. 100
3. Force predecessors to condition business transfers on
the successor's assumption of the collective bargaining
agreement." 1
4. Provide a basis for enjoining and preventing business
transfers. 02
5. Impose significant liabilities on predecessors for breach of
successor provisions by the predecessor 03 or the suc-
cessor.10
6. Effectively "pierce the corporate veil" by imposing per-
sonal liability on shareholders for breach of successor
provisions. 05
A review of collective bargaining agreements indicates that
the various contractual obligations imposed on employers by
successorship provisions may be broken down into essentially
three categories: (1) no contractual obligations; (2) mild con-
tractual obligations; (3) strong contractual -obligations. Each
of these categories and the corresponding successorship lan-
guage is addressed separately in the following discussion.
99. See, e.g., Darling & Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 919 (1977) (Martin, Arb.).
100. Id.
101. See, e.g., Roadway Express, 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8528 (1980)
(Tamoush, Arb.).
102. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 961 v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 502 F Supp. 1292,
1294 (D. Colo. 1980).
103. Id.
104. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hotel Employees, Local 531, 623 F.2d 61, 64 (9th Cir.
1980).
105. See, e.g., Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128 (1980) (Simons,
Arb.).
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B. Successorship Provisions
1. No Contractual Obligations
According to a recent survey by the Bureau of National
Affairs, seventy-one percent of the collective bargaining agree-
ments reviewed contained no "successors and assigns" lan-
guage. 10 6 This statistic does not mean, however, that employ-
ers should take union proposals for successorship provisions
lightly The study revealed an increasing prevalence of such
provisions in the contracts of four major employing industries:
leather, utilities, transportation and furniture.10 7 In these in-
dustries successorship provisions were present in at least fifty
percent of the collective bargaining agreements. 108 Fur-
thermore, the Board considers proposals for successorship lan-
guage to be a mandatory subject of bargaining. 0 9 Employers
should neither ignore nor willingly concede to union demands
for successorship provisions.
It remains true, however, that collective bargaining agree-
ments impose no contractual obligations on predecessors to
condition business transfers on the successor's assumption of
the contract when the contract includes no successorship lan-
guage."10 Employers may still find themselves burdened with
undesired legal obligations, however, if boilerplate successor-
ship language of this nature is placed in the sales agreement
under which a business is transferred. The presence of such
language in the sales agreement may be interpreted as indi-
cating that the successor has in fact assumed the predecessor's
labor relations obligations."' The prospective successor em-
ployer who desires to function with his own work force and to
rearrange the business operations should therefore scrutinize
the sales agreement for such boilerplate successorship lan-
guage and should insist on its elimination from the agreement.
If this course is followed, the successor employer will be free
to structure its business operations so as to avoid incurring
recognition and bargaining obligations toward the predeces-
106. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 36:5 (1976).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. UMW (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 N.L.R.B. 573, 575 (1977).
110. Decatur Herald & Review, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745 (1979) (Jones, Arb.).
111. Darling & Co., 68 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 917, 919 (1977) (Martin, Arb.).
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sor's union under the successorship doctrine.
2. Mild Contractual Obligations
Collective bargaining agreements which impose relatively
mild contractual obligations in the case of a business transfer
may be of two types: (1) there may be only a brief mention of
"successors and assigns" in the preamble of the agreement, or
(2) the agreement may contain "successors and assigns" lan-
guage which only implies rather than clearly imposes contrac-
tual obligations on the predecessor employer. In the second
type of agreement, the successorship provisions are separately
placed within the body of the agreement.
A clause typical of the first category of agreement is:
This Agreement is made and entered into this 29th Day of
March 1971, by and between CROWN CORK & SEAL
COMPANY, INC., Plant No. 8, Atlanta, Georgia, or its suc-
cessors, hereinafter referred to as the Company; and the
GENERAL TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION No. 528, affili-
ated with the INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND
HELPERS OF AMERICA, or its successors, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Union.112
Illustrative of the second category is the following clause:
"This Agreement shall be binding upon the successors, as-
signs, purchasers, lessees or transferees of the Employer
whether such succession, assignment or transfer be effected
voluntarily or by operation of law or by merger or consolida-
tion with another company provided the establishment re-
mains in the same line of business."'113
a. Successor Lability
As stated earlier, the "mere existence" of successorship
language does not compel succeeding employers to bargain
with or recognize the predecessor's union or to adopt its labor
obligations. The successor employer may properly structure
112. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 70:181
(1976).
113. Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, 417 U.S. 249, 266 n.2 (1974) (quoting Detroit Local Joint Exec. Bd., Hotel
& Restaurant Employees v. Howard Johnson Co., 482 F.2d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1973).
[Vol. 65:213
SUCCESSORSHIP LAW
the business takeover and thereby avoid such obligations
under successorship law.114 If the employer can accommodate
its business needs to this structuring, it will not be obligated
to bargain or arbitrate with the union.
b. Predecessor Liability
The lack of clear obligatory successorship language does
not relieve predecessors of all liability if the successor does
not assume the collective bargaining agreement. The prede-
cessor's liability under these circumstances turns upon the
construction given to the relevant language. The most crucial
issue which arises concerning agreements with mild successor-
ship language is whether the language is strong enough to im-
pose a contractual obligation on the predecessor to insist that
the successor adopt the contract as a condition of sale.
In Howard Johnson, the Supreme Court indicated that an
injunctive remedy could lie under the relatively mild succes-
sorship language in the predecessor's bargaining agreement. 11 5
Unions have successfully enjoined and prevented business
transfers under successorship provisions which read as
follows:
1. This Agreement shall be binding upon the parties, their
successors and assigns.216
2. This Agreement shall be equally binding on the Employer
and its successors and assigns, and it is the intent of the
parties that this Agreement shall remain in effect for its full
term and bind the successors of the respective parties.117
Those cases submitted for arbitral determination of the effect
of relatively mild successorship language yield conflicting re-
sults. There is arbitral authority which holds that a reference
to "successors and assigns" in the contract preamble does not
114. See supra § IV-E.
115. 417 U.S. at 258 n.3. See also Local No. 1266, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Panoramic Corp., 109 L.R.R.M. 2169 (7th Cir. 1981), a recent
decision in which the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's
injunction of a sale pending arbitration based on a reference to "successors" in the
preamble of the collective bargaining agreement.
116. Local 1115 Joint Bd. Nursing Home & Hosp. Employees v. B & K Invs., Inc.,
436 F Supp. 1203, 1206 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
117. Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881, 881 (1979) (Belkin,
Arb.). See discussion of temporary restraining order issued on the basis of the succes-
sorship language. Id. at 883.
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impose rights or obligations on the parties involved.118 The
language is considered as having no force and effect and is
regarded as "boilerplate" which at the most signifies the par-
ties' willingness to have the successor assume the agreement if
it desires to do so."' Arbitrators who view the language in this
light have refused to impose an affirmative duty on the prede-
cessor employer to insist on the successor's adoption of the
collective bargaining agreement. 20
Conversely, there is also arbitral authority which gives ef-
fect to references to "successors" in the preamble of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.' 2' However, this view should not
prevail because it conflicts with well-established principles of
arbitration which prohibit arbitrators from adding new or dif-
ferent provisions to the collective bargaining agreement."'
This view may also conflict with the grievance provision in the
agreement, which may expressly bar the arbitrator from ad-
ding provisions to the agreement.' 3
The cases in which arbitrators have interpreted the effect
of "mild" successorship provisions placed separately in the
collective bargaining agreement have also yielded conflicting
results. For example, there is arbitral authority which holds
that the following successorship provision obligates the prede-
cessor to condition the sale of its business upon the succes-
sor's assumption of the collective bargaining agreement:
"'This Agreement shall be equally binding on the Employer
and its successors and assigns, and it is the intent of the par-
ties that this Agreement shall remain in effect for its full term
and bind the successors of the respective parties.' "1124
The arbitrator in Schneter's Foods considered the clause
just quoted to be a "clear and unambiguous" expression of the
118. See, e.g., Storer Broadcasting Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8087
(1978) (Ellman, Arb.).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Storer Broadcasting Co., 78-1 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 1 8087 (1978)
(Ellman, Arb.), which discusses a decision by Arbitrator Keefe giving effect to a refer-
ence to "successors" in a contract preamble.
122. Decatur Herald & Review, Inc., 73 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 745, 754 (1979) (Jones,
Arb.).
123. Id.
124. Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881, 881 (1979) (Belkin,
Arb.); National Tea Co. (1973) (Teple, Arb.) (unpublished award).
[Vol. 65:213
,SUCCESSORSHIP LAW
parties' intent. 12 5 However, it should be noted that in
Schneter's Foods the purchasing employer met the case law
definition of a successor with bargaining obligations.126 Based
on this factual distinction, the argument can be made that a
different result is warranted if the purchaser does not meet
that definition because it has implemented the steps outlined
earlier in this article. The arbitral precedent only establishes
that the contractual "successors and assigns" language is op-
erative for employers who are "successors" under the case law.
Thus, predecessor employers can structure business trans-
fers under collective bargaining agreements with relatively
mild obligatory successorship language with a minimum of
risk of liability Some risk is involved, however, in two re-
spects: (1) the predecessor does not control the succeeding
employer's conduct and therefore cannot control whether or
not it will meet the case law definition of a "successor," and
(2) the arbitrator might not limit the meaning of the "succes-
sors and assigns" language.
A predecessor's success in avoiding liability under these
circumstances may depend on the forum and the timing of the
union's challenge to the business transfer. If the union selects
the grievance/arbitration forum after the sale, the purchasing
employer would have had adequate time to structure its oper-
ations to establish indicia that it is not a "successor." How-
ever, if the union enjoins the sale before the transfer then the
potential buyer and the predecessor may be unable to per-
suade a court that the contemplated structural and organiza-
tional plans would make the imposition of successor obliga-
tions inappropriate. Further, a court may be more impressed
with the contractual language cited by the union than with
unsubstantiated claims of nonsuccessorship presented by the
employer.
It may be concluded that collective bargaining agreements
with relatively mild successorship language present potential
liabilities for the employers involved. However, these liabili-
ties may be avoided in some cases by properly structuring the
business transfer.
125. 72 Lab. Arb. at 885.
126. Id. at 886-87.
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3. Strong Contractual Obligations
Collective bargaining agreements increasingly contain suc-
cessorship provisions which impose express duties on prede-
cessor employers contemplating business transfers. The fol-
lowing provisions extracted from arbitration awards and a
court decision have created substantial liabilities for predeces-
sor employers:
1. In the event the entire operation or rights only, are sold,
leased, transferred, or taken over by sale, transfer, lease, as-
signment, receivership, or bankruptcy proceedings, such op-
eration or use of such rights shall continue to be subject to
the terms and conditions of this Agreement for the life
thereof.
In the event the Employer fails to require the purchaser,
transferee, or lessee to assume the obligations of this Agree-
ment, the Employer shall be liable to the Local Union
and to the employees covered for all damages sustained as a
result of such failure to require assumption of the terms of
this Agreement, but shall not be liable after the purchaser,
the transferee or lessee has agreed to assume the obligations
of this Agreement."
2. New Owner - This Agreement shall be binding upon the
successors and assigns of the parties hereto. In the event of
a bona fide sale or transfer of any store covered by this
Agreement during the period hereof, the new owner or such
transferee shall be notified of the obligation of this Agree-
ment and be required to become a party hereto. The former
owner shall be required to meet any and all monetary bene-
fits that employees have accumulated up to the time of sale
or transfer under this Agreement.121
3. "68. SALE OR TRANSFER OF BUSINESS. The parties
agree that this agreement shall be binding upon the Associa-
tion, the members of the Association and the Union and
their respective transferees, successors and assigns, and that
they will faithfully comply with its provisions.
In the event that a member of the Association sells or trans-
fers the business or the shop, such member shall neverthe-
127. Teamsters Local 961 v. Graves Truck Line, Inc., 502 F Supp. 1292, 1296 (D.
Colo. 1980).
128. Roadway Express, 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 8528 at 5359 (1980)
(Tamoush, Arb.).
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less continue to be liable for the complete performance of
this agreement until the purchaser or transferee expressly
agrees in writing with the Union that it is fully bound by the
terms of this agreement.' 129
a. Successor Liability
Notwithstanding strong language like that in the examples
above, the succeeding employer who is not a "successor"
under the case law incurs little risk by refusing to adopt con-
tracts containing such language, for the reasons discussed in
previous sections of this article. 130 If the succeeding employer
is a "successor," then under some arbitral precedent' 3' it may
be required to remedy the predecessor's breach of the con-
tract. This could result, in effect, in the adoption of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement by the successor.
b. Predecessor Liability
The predecessor's liability for violating strongly worded
successorship provisions is clear. Such provisions have been
interpreted as unequivocally requiring a sale or transfer to be
conditioned upon the adoption of the contract regardless of
whether or not the purchaser is legally a successor. It is highly
unlikely that any sale or transfer of a business under such an
agreement could be consummated unless it was conditioned
upon the adoption of the predecessor's contract.
In the case of the first example given above of a strongly
worded successorship provision, the union obtained a prelimi-
nary injunction which enjoined the business transfer even
though the would-be successor technically "assumed" the
agreement. The assumption would have resulted in a Board
unit clarification dispute, and the court concluded that the ar-
bitrator should decide before the transfer whether the as-
sumption would conform with the agreement.132
Under the second provision, the predecessor was found in
breach of the successorship clause even though the entire bar-
129. Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128, 131 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
130. See supra § V-B-2-a.
131. Schneier's Finer Foods, Inc., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 881, 883 (1979) (Belkin,
Arb.).
132. Teamsters Local 961 v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 502 F Supp. 1292 (D. Colo.
1980).
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gaining unit had been laid off prior to the sale. The arbitrator
concluded that the layoffs were a subterfuge to avoid the suc-
cessorship provision and ordered the grievants made whole
under the collective bargaining agreement until it expired on
July 1, 1982, or until the successor assumed the agreement. 133
In the case of the third example given above, the arbitrator
interpreted the successorship provision as imposing a continu-
ing obligation on the predecessor to perform the agreement if
the successor did not expressly agree to assume the con-
tract.' The predecessor was prevented from transferring the
business to a new owner who indicated he would refuse to
honor the agreement but would recognize another union. 35
These types of successorship provisions essentially restrict
business transfers to those parties who will agree to adopt and
ultimately comply with the union's collective bargaining
agreement. These strongly worded successorship clauses have
been attacked as "hot cargo" provisions which violate sections
8(e) and 8(b)(4)(B) of the Act. 136 However, the clauses have
consistently survived these attacks because, in all but one
case, 137 employers have been unable to establish that the sale
of assets met the "doing business" requirements under section
8(e). 138 The Board has not considered the sale or transfer of
133. Roadway Express, 80-2 Lab. Arb. Awards (CCH) 5 8528 (1980) (Tamoush,
Arb.).
134. Hosanna Trading Co., 74 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 128, 131 (1980) (Simons, Arb.).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., District No. 71, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Harris Truck & Trailer
Sales) 224 N.L.R.B. 100 (1976).
Section 8(e) provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any em-
ployer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby
such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling,
using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any con-
tract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an
agreement shall be to such extent unenforceable and void.
29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976). The Board has interpreted this section as prohibiting em-
ployers and unions from entering into either express or implied agreements (so-called
hot cargo clauses) to cease doing business with other persons. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees, Local 531, 237 N.L.R.B. 1204 (1978).
137. National Maritime Union v. Commerce Tankers Corp., 457 F.2d 1127 (2d
Cir. 1972).
138. See UMW (Lone Star Steel Co.), 231 N.L.R.B. 573 (1977); District No. 71,
Int'l Ass'n of Machinists (Harris Truck & Trailer Sales), 224 N.L.R.B. 100 (1976);
Operating Eng'rs, Local 701 (Tru-Mix Constr. Co.), 221 N.L.R.B. 751 (1975). For the
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a business enterprise to be a business transaction. Rather, it
is viewed as a substitution of one entity for another while the
business continues.139 Therefore, the argument that strong
successorship clauses constitute hot cargo provisions which vi-
olate the Act has not been successful for clauses restricting
sales transfers, 4 although it does have merit for employers
whose successorship provisions restrict leasing arrange-
ments.141
An analysis of the language and a review of the case law
interpreting strongly worded successorship provisions indi-
cates that predecessor employers who are hamstrung by these
provisions have few options. One possibility is to forego
planned transfers until the contract terminates, but under
these circumstances the employer must ensure that the suc-
cessorship clause does not survive the contract's termination.
A second option is to renegotiate the successorship provision.
VI. CONCLUSION
Through the use of successorship concepts the courts have
effectively balanced the interests of the parties involved in a
business transfer. Under the case-by-case approach the partic-
ular factual circumstances are analyzed so as to balance the
interests of the unions, employees, employers and the public
in a way that effectuates the policies of the national labor
laws. Strongly worded successorship provisions destroy any
opportunity to weigh the interests of the parties since these
clauses traditionally represent only the union's interests. Em-
ployers must avoid such provisions or their presence in a col-
lective bargaining agreement may effectively prevent the sale
or transfer of the business. Furthermore, successorship lan-
guage, whether mild or strong, should be cautiously inter-
preted by courts and arbitrators, since the unwarranted ex-
pansion of remedies available to unions in a successorship
context may inhibit the transfer of capital in a free market.
text of § 8(e) see supra note 136.
139. See cases cited supra note 138.
140. See Chicago Dining Room Employees, Local 42, 248 N.L.R.B. 604, 606 n.4
(1980).
141. Id.
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